WestConnex
WestConnex New South Wales | |
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General information | |
Type | Motorway (Under construction) |
Length | 33 km (21 mi) |
Opened | 2023 (expected) |
Major junctions | |
West end | |
East end | |
Highway system | |
Highways in Australia National Highway • Freeways in Australia Highways in New South Wales | |
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WestConnex is a motorway scheme currently under construction in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. The scheme, a joint project of the New South Wales and Australian governments, encompasses widening and extension of the M4 Western Motorway, a new section for the M5 South Western Motorway, and a new inner western bypass of the Sydney CBD connecting the M4 and M5. Together, these projects would build or upgrade some 33 kilometres (21 mi) of the Sydney motorway network. The initial M4 widening and King Georges Road Interchange Upgrades began construction in 2015 and are due for completion in 2017; The M4 East and New M5 Tunnel stages started work in mid-2016 and are due for completion in 2019 and 2020 respectively; the final stages, M4–M5 link, Iron Cove Link and Sydney Gateway are expected to begin construction in 2019 and be completed by 2023.[1]
Constructions costs alone for WestConnex are estimated at A$16.8 billion.[2] Once land acquisitions,[3] network extensions development costs and the cost of operations[4] are accounted for, the total cost will be around $20 billion dollars. Described as "the biggest transport project in Sydney since the Harbour Bridge"[5] and costing "in current dollars, double the Snowy River scheme", the project has been widely criticised on economic, social and process grounds[6] and has been the subject of escalating public protest.[7]
History
The first comprehensive plan for Sydney motorways, the Cumberland County Plan, was released by the then county council in 1948 and adopted in 1951 by the NSW Government. The Plan envisaged a radial motorway network centred on Sydney's central business district (CBD). Though construction of the roads progressed slowly – by 1971 only isolated sections were complete – the Plan ensured corridors were reserved, providing property owners with certainty about future infrastructure.[8]
This changed in 1976 with the election of the Australian Labor Party under Premier Neville Wran. Wran, faced with his predecessors' ambitious infrastructure plans, inner-city opposition to motorway projects (including a powerful 'Green Bans' movement) and a deteriorating financial situation, halted work on inner-city projects, scaled back the under-construction Eastern Suburbs railway line and eliminated a number of the Cumberland Plan's inner-city road reservations.
Though Wran's decision to sell off the M4 East corridor was later criticised,[9] the Cumberland Plan's radial concept was anyway beginning to lose relevance. The city's passenger and freight gateway had shifted 14 kilometres (8.7 mi) south of the CBD, with long-distance passengers increasingly arriving via Sydney Airport, not Circular Quay or Central Station; and Port Botany increasingly supplanting Sydney Harbour as the city's main shipping hub. At the same time, employment was decentralising. Retailers were clustering in new suburban shopping malls; factories were moving to less constrained greenfield sites in the outer suburbs; and many companies were moving to suburban campus-style office parks.[8]
In 1987, the then Department of Main Roads released Roads 2000, which shifted the focus of motorway planning from completing the CBD-centric radial system and addressed the growing number of cross-suburban vehicle journeys instead.[10] The Western Motorway, now known as the M4, was completed from the Blue Mountains to Concord in 1992. The South-Western motorway, known as the M5, reached from Prestons to Beverly Hills by 1995.[11]
The unfinished M5 East section of the orbital, between Beverly Hills and the airport, remained contentious. Although a surface corridor had been reserved for much of the route, the government of Bob Carr was anxious to minimise the surface impact. After last-minute revisions to the design, the resulting motorway, opened in 2001, was too steep for laden trucks returning from Port Botany, significantly increasing vehicle emissions and frequently overwhelming the ventilation system.[12] Options for the M4 East were exhibited in 2003, but the government was divided over the proposal and ultimately did not proceed with it.[13]
"First things first" strategy
Elected in 2011 on a promise to create an integrated transport strategy for the city, the Liberal-led government of Premier Barry O'Farrell established an independent advisory body, led by former premier Nick Greiner, to assess projects and determine priorities. Greiner's Infrastructure NSW (iNSW) evaluated a number of long-standing motorway proposals, including the M4 East, the F6 extension and the M2-F3 link. iNSW released its strategy, entitled First Things First, the following year. The plan identified a 33-kilometre (21 mi) motorway scheme, which it named "WestConnex", as the state's top road priority. The creation of WestConnex was one of the major points of agreement between two competing strategic transport reports, commissioned simultaneously in 2011 by the NSW Government, from iNSW and Transport for NSW.[14] O'Farrell accepted the recommendation, committing $1.8 billion to begin work.
The initial scheme called for:
- widening of the existing M4 between Parramatta and Homebush
- an M4 East tunnel from Concord to Haberfield
- a new "M4 South" tunnel from Haberfield to St Peters, near Port Botany and the airport
- widening of the existing M5 East
- improvements to surface roads around the port and airport.[15]
The M4 South component would provide the first step towards an inner-city bypass. Transport for New South Wales, which released its long-term integrated transport plan around the same time, committed to further planning work on the northern section of the bypass. iNSW estimated the benefit-cost ratio for WestConnex at "more than 1.5", noting that the removal of freight traffic from Parramatta Road could also facilitate urban regeneration along the Inner West's main road link.[15]
Focused as it was on journeys to and from the international gateways at Botany Bay, the scheme did not include a direct connection to the CBD. This proved a stumbling block in securing federal funding for the project, despite the risk of a motorway direct to the city competing with existing public transport services.[16][17] With a change of government in 2013, the federal government's opposition was reversed.[18]
Later modifications
The scheme underwent a number of changes from the concept recommended by iNSW in 2012. In particular, the government realigned the proposed M4 South to accommodate a link to a future second harbour road tunnel, with a view to one day completing an inner-city bypass.[19] This would mean a large interchange at the site of the abandoned Rozelle Rail Yards close to the Anzac Bridge.[20] This interchange was later moved underground.[20] A tunnel under Rozelle was added to bypass the congested Victoria Road corridor and connect with the Rozelle Rail Yard interchange.[20] A large park will be built above the interchange.[20] Stub tunnels have also been added as part of Stage 2 to connect to a proposed Southern Motorway to the St George and Sutherland Shire areas.[21][22]
Staging
Stage 1: M4 Widening and M4 East
This would include widening of the present M4 from two or three to four lanes in each direction between Parramatta and Homebush Bay Drive; and new, twin three-lane motorway tunnels between Homebush and Haberfield. The latter project, being delivered by a Leighton Samsung John Holland joint venture, will connect the M4 to the CBD via the City West Link Road, Anzac Bridge and Western Distributor. Stage 1 is expected to open to traffic in 2019 and is also linked to an urban renewal program for the Parramatta Road corridor, being managed by UrbanGrowth NSW.
Stage 2: King Georges Road Interchange, New M5 and Sydney Gateway
Includes upgrading the existing M5 interchange at King Georges Road and building the "New M5" between the M5 at Beverly Hills and St Peters. Stage 2 will be designed to allow for future connection to the Sydney–Wollongong motorway which connects to Waterfall.
In January 2016, the Wolli Creek Preservation Society raised concerns that complying offsets are unlikely to be available for the irreparable damage to the Beverly Grove bushland from the temporary use of 1.4 hectares (3.5 acres) as a construction compound. The 1.87-hectare (4.6-acre) Beverly Grove bushland was one of the larger remnant patches of the Cooks River/Castlereagh Ironbark ecological community (CCRIF). Further, the 1.4 hectares (3.5 acres) of critically endangered CCRIF cleared was an offset from the original M5 East.[23]
On 11 July 2016, the Second Turnbull Ministry announced the environmental approval for Stage 2 of the WestConnex motorway with a captive breeding plan and construction and maintenance of additional habitat for the green and golden bell frog and offsets for damage to the critically endangered CCRIF.[24][25]
This stage would also involve the construction of Sydney Gateway, a new high capacity link linking the planned New M5 and M4–M5 Link at St Peters to the northern end of Sydney Airport as well as upgrading local and arterial roads nearby. Initial construction on Sydney Gateway began in 2015 with further construction to begin around 2019 and be fully completed by 2023.
Stage 3: M4–M5 Link and Iron Cove Link
Currently in the early stages of planning, WestConnex's third and final stage is planned to be a new motorway tunnel between the M4 East at Haberfield and the "New M5" at St Peters, with direct connections to the Anzac Bridge and provision for a future Western Harbour Tunnel. A late addition, publicised in July 2016, includes a 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) tunnel from the Iron Cove Bridge to the planned interchange at the Rozelle rail yards to bypass the congested Victoria Road corridor.[20][26] Stage 3 would also form the southern section of an eventual Inner West bypass.
Support
WestConnex received support from third party organisations, such as the motoring lobby group the NRMA, which argued that it would help improve transport in Sydney's west[27] and complete a plan from 1947.[28] On 3 October 2012, press releases in support of the "missing motorway" were issued by Infrastructure Partnerships Australia,[29] Sydney Business Chamber,[30] and the Sydney Airport Corporation.[31]
Opposition
Elements of the WestConnex scheme encountered strident opposition from a range of stakeholders, among them academics, architects, resident action groups, an industry group, local councils, a developer lobby, the Australian Labor Party and the Greens, with some strongly opposed to the project in its entirety.[32] Among the project's most high-profile opponents has been Sydney Lord Mayor Clover Moore, who commissioned a report to Council on the project. Almost 12,900 submissions were lodged with NSW Planning in response to the environmental impact statement, many highly critical of the project.[33] Marrickville Council told WestConnex it will not approve preliminary work until the project as a whole is approved,[34] but observers note that the "scope of the project ... continues to expand",[35] as does the cost.[36][37]
Public transport
The Lord Mayor's report, released a month before the 2015 election, criticised the project and recommended that a new railway line be built along the M4 Western Motorway and M4 East corridor instead, to parallel the existing Inner West Line.[38] The impact of the project on public transport continued to be a matter of concern into 2016 with "no detail on what sort of public transport will be included on the road surface"[39] and repeatedly expressed concerns that experience with motorways shows they generate traffic and increase congestion[7] and that Westconnex will similarly add to congestion, rather than relieving it.[35] The project is criticised as as a "crude 1950s response to our complex 21st century transport needs".[40]
Planning and approval processes
The planning and approval process for Stage 1A of the scheme (widening the M4) was criticised by Grant Hehir, the NSW Auditor-General, for failing to abide by the Government's own assurance arrangements for major projects. While Hehir made clear it was not his intention to assess the merit or value of the project per se, he identified "a number of deficiencies in governance and independent assurance over the early stages" and made recommendations for change.[41]
In response to Hehir's recommendations, the RMS only committed to addressing them for "future more complex stages", leaving the governance arrangements for the current stages unaltered.[42][43]
The methods by which the project's value, its cost and benefits as well as the fairness of their distribution have all been challenged.[6] In particular, it is argued that the projections of the economic benefits brought by the project use modelling "...devised by highway agencies in the 1960s to justify the massive cost of urban motorways".[44] The government, although "urged" to consider the fairness of the process of compulsory acquisition for the land required for the project and act on recommendations in a legal report to improve it, decided to take "no further action".[45][46]
Environmental impacts
The project has been criticised for its potential impact on the green and golden bell frog at Kogarah golf club.[47] Protests have been strong against the felling of mature heritage trees in preparation for "the 40-hectare spaghetti interchange - as big as Sydney Park itself".[40][48][49]
Heritage impacts
The destruction of heritage properties in Haberfield, a suburb listed in its entirety as a Conservation area, has been the subject of specific criticism, especially when the chair of the Greater Sydney Commission said she was unaware of it.[50][51] The compulsorily acquisition of residential properties in inner-city suburbs for the project, including "at least 50 listed heritage buildings"[7][52] has been the subject of much criticism and opposition on grounds of disruption, loss of heritage and unfairness of process, including the Government's decision to release only the executive summary of the project's business case.[4][53]
Secrecy
After the WestConnex Authority was closed in October 2015, the project's transfer to the Sydney Motorway Corporation was criticised on the basis that this there were then no representatives from transport agencies on the board of the new "private corporation" and also that information about the project would no longer need to be disclosed in the same way that government entities normally did.[54] A proposal in 2016 for an additional tunnel between Iron Cove Bridge and an interchange at Rozelle, required the acquisition of further residential properties. Residents whose homes were affected reportedly received letters about such acquisitions on the same day that the responsible Government Minister said final decisions on them "had yet to be made".[35] The Russell Review of the acquisition system in 2012 had not been released by 2016.[37]
Funding
Originally, WestConnex was to be 75% paid for by tolls. The finance was to mostly be loans from the private sector, with $2 to $3 billion worth of loans and grants from the State and Federal Governments.[55] All loans are to be repaid by privatising each section as it is completed.[4]
- Tolls
The Government's tolling strategy is based on distance-based charging. Tolling on existing sections of WestConnex (the existing M4 and M5) will start as each section is expanded. Tolling on new sections of WestConnex (the M4 East and the New M5) will begin as each sections open. Tolling will continue until 2060.[56]
Once tolling on a section starts, the charge will consist of a flag fall, plus a charge per kilometre, with a maximum charge, calculated as follows:[57]
- flagfall of $1.04, plus inflation,
- plus a per kilometre charge of $0.38/km, plus inflation,
- cap of $7.35, plus inflation.
Where inflation is defined as:
- 4% a year, or CPI, for each year from 2013 to 2038 (whichever is higher),
- CPI, for each year from 2039 until 2060.
And:
- heavy vehicles are to pay a rate three times higher than other vehicles,
- tolls are payable each way,
- there is no discount for drivers also using a different toll road (such as Westlink M7),
- no toll after 2060.
- Finance
So far, $1.5 billion has been raised from the private sector.[58]
$7.1 billion has been provided by the State and Federal governments. The Federal government has contributed a grant of $1.5 billion, and committed to a loan of $2.0 billion. The NSW Government initially planned to contribute $1.8 billion. It has since increased its contribution to $3.6 billion, of which $1.8 billion is from the 'Restart NSW' infrastructure fund and $1.8 billion is from the State's Consolidated Fund.[59]
In 2013 Julia Gillard, Prime Minister at the time, offered a grant of $1.8 billion which was rejected by then Premier O'Farrell, as a "stunt",[17] because it came with three conditions[60] not reimposing tolls on the existing M4 motorway even if it were widened; a direct connection to the Sydney city centre; and a direct connection to Port Botany. In particular, not tolling existing roads was not acceptable as it would deny the project billions of dollars in toll revenue. Following a change of federal government, incoming Prime Minister Tony Abbott approved a grant of $1.5 billion, followed by a loan of $2.0 billion.[61]
- Benefits
The 2015 business case predicts WestConnex will deliver $22.2 billion in benefits, before deducting operating expenses.
These benefits are mostly non-cash. They are estimates of the value to users of such things as travel time saved ($12.9 billion) and increased travel time reliability ($1.47 billion) as well as reduced operating costs ($6.18 billion). All other factors are estimated to have a worth of $1.65 billion. [62]
For the purpose of calculating benefits and costs of the scheme, tolling is considered to be "a transfer payment from the user to operator", the benefit to the operator is considered to cancel out the disbenefit to the user, and as such, tolling has an "neutral effect on overall benefits and costs". [62]
- Costs
The estimated cost of WestConnex has not been disclosed but is around $20 billion.
As of 2016, construction costs are $16.8 billion, not including "land acquisition, network extensions, and development costs".[22] Land acquisition costs are "set to easily exceed $1.5B". [3] The cost of network extensions has not been disclosed and neither has the cost of 'development costs',[22] both are said to be significant.
In addition, there will be operating costs which have been estimated at 1.465 billion.[4]
This does not include indirect costs, such as environmental damage or alleged shortfalls between prices paid for compulsory acquisitions and current market values.
When first proposed, WestConnex was to cost approximately $10 billion, including property acquisition and construction.[55]
- Audit
In May 2016, it was announced that the Federal Government decision to commit $3.5 billion to WestConnex project will be investigated by the Commonwealth auditor-general.[63]
Responsibility
The WestConnex Delivery Authority (WDA) was a NSW Government agency established in November 2013 to plan and manage delivery of the WestConnex motorway scheme. WDA's functions had previously been performed by a project office within Roads and Maritime Services.[64] WDA was established by the Transport Administration (General) Amendment (WestConnex Delivery Authority) Regulation 2013. Its founding chairman was businessman Tony Shepherd and its founding chief executive was Dennis Cliche. The Authority was merged into the Sydney Motorway Corporation in October 2015 with the Corporation responsible for all aspects of the project. Following the resignation of Shepherd, Peter Brecht became chair, with claims that information about the project is less available to the public since Brecht's appointment.[54]
See also
Australian roads portal
References
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (14 March 2015). "What you need to know about WestConnex, the biggest road we've ever seen". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 14 March 2015.
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Matt; Saulwick, Jacob (20 November 2015). "WestConnex motorway cost blows out by $1.4 billion". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 25 July 2016.
- 1 2 Nicholls, Sean (16 Sep 2016). "Cost of WestConnex property acquisitions set to exceed $1.5b". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 8 Oct 2016.
- 1 2 3 4 "WestConnex business case executive summary" (PDF). September 2013.
- ↑ Staples, Sarah (11 Aug 2015). "Biggest project since Harbour Bridge, Westconnex's environmental impact statement set to be released in 1 to 2 months". Daily Telegraph.
- 1 2 Standen, Chris (1 December 2015). "The way we justify investments in road projects like WestConnex doesn't add up". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 3 December 2015.
- 1 2 3 Farrelly, Elizabeth (27 April 2016). "WestConnex is a war on inner Sydney and city dwellers". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 28 April 2016.
- 1 2 Forster, Clive (1999). Australian cities: continuity and change. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- ↑ Clennell, Andrew (23 February 2012). "Future stuck in a political jam". The Daily Telegraph.
- ↑ Infrastructure New South Wales (2012). "WestConnex – Sydney's next motorway project" (PDF).
- ↑ "Metroad 5 Sydney to Campbelltown". OzRoads.
- ↑ Roads and Maritime Services (2014). "Technical paper 9: evolution of road tunnels in Sydney" (PDF).
- ↑ Goodsir, Darren (18 June 2004). "Carr's rivals fume in clash over M4 East". The Sydney Morning Herald.
- ↑ Shakibaei, Bambul (10 October 2012). "Transport for NSW vs Infrastructure NSW". Transport Sydney. Retrieved 22 January 2013.
- 1 2 Infrastructure New South Wales (2012). "First things first: the state infrastructure strategy 2012–2032" (PDF).
- ↑ "WestConnex funding promise erupts into political row". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 12 May 2013. Retrieved 13 May 2013.
- 1 2 Needham, Kristy (12 May 2013). "'What a stunt': NSW Treasurer slams Gillard government on West Connex road plan". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 13 May 2013.
- ↑ Coultan, Mark (19 September 2013). "Tony Abbott launches $11bn WestConnex motorway". The Australian. Retrieved 16 October 2015.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (21 November 2014). "Revealed: Second Sydney Harbor road tunnel". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 July 2016.
- 1 2 3 4 5 Saulwick, Jacob (21 July 2016). "New tunnel under Victoria Road added to WestConnex at no extra cost, government says". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 25 July 2016.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (3 September 2015). "Multimillion-dollar compensation brawl brews over WestConnex St Peters interchange". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 July 2016.
- 1 2 3 "WestConnex – Updated Strategic Business Case" (PDF). Sydney Motorway Corporation. November 2015. ISBN 978-1-925421-39-2. Retrieved 26 July 2016.
- ↑ Little, Deb (27 January 2016). "Submission in response to Westconnex New M5 Environmental Impact Statement (AECOM 2015): Project application no. SSI I4_6788" (PDF) (Letter). Letter to Department of Planning and Environment. Wolli Creek Preservation Society. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 March 2016.
- ↑ Hunt, Greg (11 July 2016). "Federal Government approves Stage 2 of WestConnex motorway" (Press release). Department of the Environment. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 July 2016.
- ↑ "Cooks River/Castlereagh Ironbark Forest of the Sydney Basin Bioregion". Department of the Environment and Energy. Archived from the original on 29 July 2016.
- ↑ Gerathy, Sarah (21 July 2016). "WestConnex interchange plans unveiled; Government to buy 27 properties on Victoria Road". ABC News. Retrieved 25 July 2016.
- ↑ Leggett, Cie'Jai (3 October 2012). "West Connex will get Sydney moving". The National Roads and Motorists' Association. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ↑ Stuart, Tony (15 October 2012). "After 65 years it really is time to get on with it". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ↑ "NSW brings forward congestion busting motorway projects". Infrastructure partnerships Australia. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ↑ "Sydney Business Chamber welcomes Infrastructure NSW plan". Sydney Business Chamber. 3 October 2012.
- ↑ "Sydney Airport welcomes Infrastructure NSW report". Sydney Airport. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ↑ McKenny, Leesha (30 April 2015). "Parramatta Road plans criticised by City of Sydney, Urban Taskforce, architect group". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 5 August 2016.
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Matt (23 March 2016). "Sydney residents vent opposition to WestConnex in flood of submissions". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 8 April 2016.
- ↑ O'Sullivan, Matt (7 April 2016). "Opposition to WestConnex grows as council blocks contractors from streets". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 8 April 2016.
- 1 2 3 O'Sullivan, Matt (19 July 2016). "WestConnex: Extra tunnel, road widening makes $16.8b motorway even bigger". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 5 August 2016.
- ↑ Nicholls, Sean (16 September 2016). "Cost of WestConnex property acquisitions set to exceed $1.5b". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- 1 2 Nicholls, Sean (1 October 2016). "Sydney Metro property acquisition hits $1.8 billion". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 3 October 2016.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (23 February 2015). "WestConnex: the wrong project for Sydney, report says – 'invest in public transport instead'". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (13 February 2016). "WestConnex: Fewer lanes for motorists on Parramatta Road, more for public transport". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 20 February 2016.
- 1 2 Farrelly, Elizabeth (24 September 2016). "Our trees are wiser than our leaders". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- ↑ Hehir, Grant (18 December 2014). "WestConnex assurance to the Government: Auditor-General's Report to Parliament".
- ↑ Duncan, Peter (12 December 2014). "Performance audit: WestConnex – assurance to the Government" (PDF).
- ↑ "Baird government's dismissal of Hehir report alarming". The Sydney Morning Herald. 12 January 2015. Retrieved 29 January 2015.
- ↑ Standen, Chris (1 December 2015). "The way we justify investments in road projects like WestConnex doesn't add up". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- ↑ Nicholls, Sean (19 August 2016). "Mike Baird's concern for WestConnex residents not matched by his actions". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- ↑ Nicholls, Sean (23 August 2016). "Mike Baird under fire over failure to act on WestConnex fairness advice". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- ↑ Hawke, Sarah (31 July 2015). "Fears Sydney WestConnex road project will destroy habitat for vulnerable green and golden bell frog". ABC News.
- ↑ "Defending Sydney Park – Day 1". EcoTransit Sydney. 18 September 2016.
- ↑ "Sydney Park to be trashed for WestCONnex". EcoTransit Sydney. 17 September 2016.
- ↑ Hunt, Elle (20 August 2016). "Protesters in Lucy Turnbull masks block controversial WestConnex road project". The Guardian. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- ↑ Karp, Paul (16 August 2016). "Lucy Turnbull pleads ignorance of WestConnex heritage house destruction". The Guardian. Retrieved 26 September 2016.
- ↑ Gainsford, Jim (25 January 2015). "WestConnex letters anger St Peters residents". The Sydney Morning Herald.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (17 December 2014). "Victorian example sparks fresh calls to release WestConnex business case". The Sydney Morning Herald.
- 1 2 Saulwick, Jacob (16 October 2015). "WestConnex shielded from scrutiny after control handed to private corporation". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 16 October 2015.
- 1 2 Infrastructure NSW, Transport for NSW and NSW Roads and Maritime Service (October 2012). "WestConnex – Sydney's next motorway priority" (PDF). Retrieved 8 Oct 2016.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (9 May 2015). "WestConnex: New Sydney motorway to push toll to $11 per trip". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 9 May 2015.
- ↑ "WestConnex M4/M5 Toll Calculator". Retrieved 6 October 2016.
- ↑ "$3.5 billion funding secured for WestConnex". 21 November 2015.
- ↑ "2016-17 Budget Paper No. 2 - Infrastructure Statement - Chapter 1: Investment Program" (PDF). Retrieved 6 October 2016.
- ↑ Saulwick, Jacob (15 May 2013). "Are you serious? Baird dismisses $1.8b for WestConnex". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 6 October 2016.
- ↑ "Funding agreement to fast-track construction of WestConnex". 16 May 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2016.
- 1 2 KPMG (19 November 2015). "WestConnex Full Scheme: Economic Appraisal" (PDF).
- ↑ Bullen, James (19 May 2016). "WestConnex funding to be scrutinised by auditor-general after Anthony Albanese, Senate requests". Retrieved 6 Oct 2016.
- ↑ "WestConnex Delivery Authority established". Roads and Maritime Services. 31 October 2013. Retrieved 4 August 2015.
External links
- WestConnex website
- Video summary of WestConnex, Infrastructure NSW. 14 October 2012.
- "WestConnex map" (PDF) (Map). WestConnex. 16 July 2016.