al-Qaeda guest houses, Kabul

American counter-terrorism analysts justified the continued extrajudicial detention of many Guantanamo captives because they were suspected of staying in al-Qaeda safe houses, or guest houses—or because names matching theirs, or their "known alias" were found in the suspect houses.

Claims nuclear blueprints were found in a Kabul safehouse

During a November 15, 2001 press briefing by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, and Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security Ridge confirmed a report published by The Times that the U.S. had captured nuclear blueprints in an al Qaeda guest house in Kabul.[1][2][3] Ridge stated that the capture of the nuclear blueprints in this al-Qaeda guesthouse was consistent with Osama bin Laden's plans to become a nuclear threat.

David Rohde, writing for the New York Times News Service, reported on November 17, 2001, that in addition to nuclear plans, safe houses contained flight simulator programs, documents about the handling of biological and chemical weapons, and information about flight training schools in Florida.[3]

CNN claimed to have found and gone through the Kabul safe house used by Abu Khabbab, who they described as "Osama bin Laden's top chemical and biological weapons commander."[4][5] CNN hired the Institute for Science and International Security to examine the documents they found, and its President, David Albright, confirmed the abandoned documents included plans for a nuclear bomb, and extensive training notes on the handling of radiological material.

The Combatting Terrorism Center reported that Abu Hafs al Masri (aka Mohammed Atef), al Qaida's military chief, was killed in an air strike on an "al Qa'ida safehouse" in Kabul, in November 2001.[6]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul safe houses associated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda

American counter-terrorism analysts called many of the houses "safe houses", even when the captives stayed in these houses during the time the Taliban was in power. Individuals alleged to have stayed in Kabul safe houses associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda include: Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari,[7] Ridouane Khalid Abd Al Rahman Al Zahri[8] Mamdouh Habib.[9]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul guest houses that had ties to terrorism

Intelligence analysts described a number of other individuals as having stayed in Kabul guest houses tied to terrorism, without an explicit tie to either the Taliban or al Qaeda: Muaz Hamza Ahmad Al Alawi[10] Faruq Ali Ahmed Samir Naji Al Hasan Moqbel[11] Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri Atag Ali Abdoh Al-Haj>[12] Djamel Ameziane[13] Abd Al Hadio Omar Mahmoud Faraj[14] Bessam Muhammed Saleh Al Dubaikey[15] Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov[16] Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani[17][18] Abdullah Mohammad Khan[19][20] Adel Noori[21][22] Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh[23] Mohammed Yacoub.[24]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul houses, without any explicit allegation of ties to terrorism

Some Guantanamo captives faced the allegation that they stayed in Afghan guest houses that were not explicitly tied to terrorism. They include: Arkin Mahmud[25] Issam Hamid Al Bin Ali Al Jayfi[26] Richard Belmar[27] Shawki Awad Balzuhair.[28]

Managers of suspect guest houses

Some Guantanamo captives were alleged to have managed guest houses or safe houses on behalf of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other organizations American counter-terrorism analysts asserted had ties to terrorism.

isn name allegations
Hassan Maksum
Abu Musab al-Suri
On January 19th, 2009, FBI interrogator Robert Fuller testified during a hearing before Canadian Omar Khadr's Guantanamo military commission that Khadr during interrogations in October 2002 Khadr confessed to staying at a Kabul guest house run by "Abu Musab al-Suri".[29] Fuller testified that Khadr said he saw fellow Canadian Maher Arar at this guest house. This report stirred controversy in Canada, because an official inquiry had cleared Arar of all the US justification for his extraordinary rendition to Syria, where he was tortured. In particular, his assertion that he had never been to Afghanistan.
330
  • One of the allegation on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Maasoum Abdah Mouhammad's (aka Kari Bilal) Combatant Status Review Tribunal was:[30]
The detainee operated a safe house where 5-20 personnel armed with AK-47 rifles could be found at any given time.
342 Mohammed Mubarek Salah Al Qurbi

"The detainee served as the manager of the "Al Qaida frontline's guesthouse in Kabul", Afghanistan."

10017 Abu Faraj al-Libbi

"A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July–August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The same source also stated the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida."

10025 Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi
During his 2005 annual review Sa id Salih Sa id Nashir faced the following allegations:[33]
  • The detainee worked as a guard at the Kandahar airport from 12 September 2001 until sometime in November 2001. The detainee identified a man who was a group leader of about 10 people at the airport area in Kandahaar.
  • The airport group leader is an al Qaeda leader, a veteran Afghan fighter and head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah.
During his 2005 annual review Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi faced the allegations that:[34]
  • Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah and who later took charge of the Northern front in Kabul in 2000.
During his 2006 annual review Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi faced the allegations that:[35]
  • Upon the detainee's arrival in Kabul, the detainee stayed in another Taliban house called Darol Alaman House, where he became aware that he would be fighting against the Northern Alliance.
  • While fighting for the Taliban, the detainee was under the leadership of Abdul Salam and saw Abdul Hadi Al Araqi whom the detainee describes as the General of the non Afghan Taliban troops positioned on the front line.

References

  1. ↑ Spencer Abraham, Tom Ridge (2001-11-15). "Homeland Security Briefing with Gov. Ridge and Secretary Abraham". Department of Homeland Security. Archived from the original on 2009-08-24.
  2. ↑ Alison Mitchell (2002-11-16). "Ridge Agrees Taliban Losses May Lead to New Terrorism". New York Times. Retrieved 2009-08-26. Mr. Ridge confirmed reports that designs for missiles, bombs and nuclear weapons were found in a Qaeda safe house in Kabul, but played down their significance. He said he was told that much of the information was widely available. Mr. Ridge said a report in The Times of London that the information was found half-burned in Kabul was certainly consistent with other signs that Mr. bin Laden wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.
  3. 1 2 David Rohde (2001-11-17). "Abandoned houses reveal evil-doings". Pittsburgh Post Gazette. Retrieved 2009-08-26.
  4. ↑ "CNN Discovers al Qaeda's Blueprints for Bombs". CNN. 2002-06-10. Retrieved 2009-08-26.
  5. ↑ "Was Al Qaeda Working on a Super Bomb?". CNN. 2002-01-24. Retrieved 2009-08-260. Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  6. ↑ "Abu Hafs Al Masri" (PDF). Combatting Terrorism Center. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 April 2010. Retrieved 2010-04-29. Fortunately, Abu Hafs was killed in an al-Qa’ida safehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November of 2001, when it was bombed by coalition aircraft. This was a significant blow to al-Qa’ida, as they lost one of their most stalwart and capable members. Moreover, it was a huge loss to bin Laden who lost not only his senior military commander, but also a close companion who had been with him since the very beginning of the al-Qa’ida organization.
  7. ↑ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari Administrative Review Board - page 69
  8. ↑ OARDEC (21 November 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Zahri, Abd Al Rahman" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 39–42. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 May 2008. Retrieved 2008-05-15.
  9. ↑ Unclassified documents (.pdf) from Mamdouh Habib's, Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 16-17 - mirror - pages 28-29
  10. ↑ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Muaz Hamza Ahmad Al Alawi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 16, 2004 page 230
  11. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Samir Naji Al Hasan Moqbel's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 63-69
  12. ↑ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu Al Haj Al Radai Administrative Review Board - page 34
  13. ↑ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Djamel Ameziane Administrative Review Board - pages 11-13
  14. ↑ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abd Al Hadio Omar Mahmoud Faraj's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 56
  15. ↑ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Bessam Muhammed Saleh Al Dubaikey's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 86
  16. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 7-11
  17. ↑ Summary of Evidence (.pdf) from Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, pages 14-15
  18. ↑ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani Administrative Review Board - page 12
  19. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdullah Mohammad Khan's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 107-115
  20. ↑ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdullah Mohammad Khan's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 98
  21. 1 2 3 4 OARDEC (1 July 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Adel" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 42–44. Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-19.
  22. ↑ OARDEC (18 September 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Noori, Adel" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-20.
  23. ↑ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 16, 2004 - page 152
  24. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Yacoub'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 51-64
  25. ↑ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Arkin Mahmud's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - November 9, 2004 - page 49
  26. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Issam Hamid Al Bin Ali Al Jayfi'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 13-22
  27. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Richard Dean Belmar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 10-17
  28. ↑ OARDEC (18 October 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Balzuhair, Shawki Awad" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 28. Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2008-01-08.
  29. ↑ Omar el Akkad, Colin Freeze (2009-01-19). "Khadr said Arar was at Afghan camp, court told". Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 20 January 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-20. Robert Fuller, who interrogated Mr. Khadr in October of 2002, while the then-15-year-old was detained at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, testified that Mr. Khadr said he saw Mr. Arar in a Kabul guesthouse run by a suspected al-Qaeda operative known as Abu Musab al-Suri.
  30. ↑ OARDEC (5 October 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Maasoum Abdah Mouhammad aka: Bilal, Kari" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 66. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 March 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-12.
  31. ↑ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Mubarek Salah Al Qurbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 10-13
  32. ↑ Summary of Evidence prepared for Abu Faraj al-Libbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, February 8, 2007
  33. ↑ OARDEC (2005-11-23). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Nashir, Sa id Salih Sa id" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 7–9. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 December 2008. Retrieved 2008-12-07.
  34. ↑ OARDEC (2005-04-18). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Hanashi, Mohammed Ahmed Abdullah Saleh" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 81–83. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 January 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-30.
  35. ↑ OARDEC (2006-03-02). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Hanashi, Mohammed Ahmed Abdullah Saleh" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 54–57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-28.
  36. ↑ "Pentagon: Top al Qaeda leader taken to Guantanamo". CNN. April 27, 2007. Archived from the original on 29 April 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-27.
  37. ↑ "US holds 'senior al-Qaeda figure'". BBC News Online. 2007-04-27. Archived from the original on 14 May 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-27.
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