R v Hancock

R v Hancock
Court House of Lords
Decided 27 February 1985
Citation(s) 1985 UKHL 9
Cases cited R v Moloney [1985] AC 905
Legislation cited common law
Case history
Prior action(s) R v Hancock [1985] 3 W.L.R. 1014
Subsequent action(s) None
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting Lord Scarman, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Roskill, Lord Brightman, Lord Griffiths
Keywords
Murder; manslaughter; intent; mens rea

R v Hancock [1985] UKHL 9 is an English legal decision of the House of Lords setting out the relationship between foresight of consequences and intention in cases of murder. The defendants' stated intention had been to frighten a person, but another was killed. The decision turned on the relationship between foresight of the results of taking a particular action and the result of that action, and the directions to be given to the jury in such circumstances.

Facts

During the UK miners' strike (1984–1985), the defendants dropped a concrete block from a bridge with the intention of scaring a coal miner being taken to work in a taxi. Instead, the taxi driver, David Wilkie, was killed. During questioning, the defendants admitted intending to frighten the miner out of attending work, but denied an intention to kill or cause serious injury to him. At the trial, their offer to plead guilty to manslaughter was rejected by the prosecution, who pursued convictions for murder.

Trial

The trial judge directed the jury in accordance with R v Moloney[1] that

the prosecution case could be compressed into one question and answer, the question being "what else could a person who pushed or threw such objects have intended but to cause really serious bodily harm to the occupants of the car?"

as submitted by the prosecution.

The jury, after some deliberation, sought clarification because

the precise legal definitions regarding the committing of murder and manslaughter are causing dissent because of lack of knowledge, particularly with regard to intent and foreseeable consequences.

and the judge gave a further direction but did not expand on his previous guidance. Verdicts of guilty were returned and the defendants sentenced to life imprisonment.

Appeals

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's use of the Moloney guidelines may have misled the jury as they had been given no guidance as to the weight to be given to the actual foresight of a consequence (i.e. death or serious bodily harm) in determining the intent to cause that consequence. It was ruled that this omission was fatal, as in Moloney it had been stated that

the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent

Since this guidance had not been available to the jury, the Court substituted verdicts of manslaughter, and the prosecution then appealed.

The House of Lords reviewed the Moloney guidelines, and cited the main principles that

*the mental element in murder is a specific intent, the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, and nothing less suffices
  • foresight of consequences is no more than evidence of the existence of the intent; it must be considered, and its weight assessed, together with all the evidence in the case.
  • foresight does not necessarily imply the existence of intention, though it may be a fact from which when considered with all the other evidence a jury may think it right to infer the necessary intent
  • the probability of the result of an act is an important matter for the jury to consider and can be critical in their determining whether the result was intended.

The court agreed with the Court of Appeal in deciding that the Moloney guidelines were defective in that the issue of probability should specifically be addressed by the trial judge, and since that had not occurred in the present case, the prosecutor's appeal was dismissed, and the convictions for manslaughter stood.

References

  1. R v Moloney 1985 A.C. 905
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