General der Nachrichtenaufklärung

The GdNA (German: Oberkommando des Heeres/General der Nachrichtenaufklärung) was the Signals intelligence agency of the Wehrmacht, before and during World War II. It was the successor to the former cipher bureau known as Inspectorate 7/VI, until it was reorganized in 1944 into the GdNA.[1][2] The agency was also known at the OKH/Gend Na, GendNa or Inspectorate 7 or more commonly OKH/GdNA.

History

1919–1933

Little was known about the Signals Intelligence of the German Army during this period. A Codes and Ciphers Section of the German Defence Ministry (German:Reichswehrministerium Chiffrierabteilung) was subordinated to an Army Signal Officer, that had been maintained in skeleton form since the end of the World War I.[3] The following people were directors of the unit:

The directors of the ciphers section also controlled the Defense Ministry's intercept network, which were used to gather operational intelligence and were divided into two branches. The first branch was the fixed intercept network stations were dated from 1923-1924 (German:Feste Horstelle) abbv. Feste, and at least seven stations were operating before 1933 in military districts.[4] The second intercept branch was the motorized Intercept Companies (German:HorchKompanien), created by Fellgiebel himself. Six of stationary intercept stations was aligned specifically to the interception of foreign military traffic and the last one specifically designed for foreign diplomatic traffic. The military traffic stations were: Stuttgart, Munich, Muenster, Koenigsberg, Leignitz and Breslau[5] with the diplomatic traffic intercept station located at Treuenbrietzen.[6] Each intercept station was assigned a series of intercept assignments, with the most important assignments monitored by two stations, e.g. the Soviet Union was monitored from Koenigsberg and Frankfurt, and so on. The assignments were established in the Assignment Plan H-Aufgabenplan. Each assignment was prioritized from 1st to 4th, sometime absolute, sometimes relative, e.g. Poland was assigned 1st for Franfurt/Oder stations and a 1st or 2nd for Koenigsberg. Priority could change depending if a country went to war.[5]

1933–1939

During the 1933–1934 period, the Defense Ministry created three more intercept stations: one Feste was at Hersbruck, (that was later moved to Lauf[7]) with the other two located at Striegau and Chemnitz.[8] Using the ten intercept stations to intercept foreign military and diplomatic communications, the Defense Ministry created its own military code and cipher section, called Intercept Control Station (HLS) (German: Horchleitstelle) in 1933/34.[9][10] To run the control station, the Ministry reassigned several trained cryptanalysts from the Ministry of the Reichswehr Codes and Cipher Section. All Army intercepts were forwarded to the HLS, but other intercept traffic types were forwarded to the Commander-In-Chief aligned agency, e.g. Foreign Air Force traffic was sent to chi-stelle, the Luftwaffe Cipher Bureau.[11] Diplomatic intercepts were sent to both German War Ministry (German: Reichskriegsministerium) and to Foreign Office civilian cipher bureau AA/Pers Z S.[12]

1939–1941

During the early years of World War II, substantial change occurred within the German Army signal intelligence service. The main developments were:

  1. The intercept service mission was narrowed to include only Army Traffic. With the formation of OKW/Chi, the signals intelligence agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in 1939, OKW/Chi took over all diplomatic intercept traffic. To help facilitate message interception, the Army transferred two interception stations at Lauf and Treuenbrietzen.[13]
  2. The intercept service expanded. In 1939, the Army established two new branch stations for the intercept of foreign Army communications from the east. The branch stations were created as Graz and Tullin.
  3. Five new Signal Intelligence Regiments (German:Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung, abbr. KONA) were created.[7] The KONA operated in the theatre as complete intercept and evaluation units, while attached to Army Groups, (e.g. Army Group A).[14] Each KONA unit was numbered from one to five. KONA units 1,2,3 were assigned to the Eastern Front. KONA 1 was assigned to the southern front, KONA 2 to the Central front and KONA 3 to the Army Group on the Northern Front. KONA 4 was not attached to any Army Group, but was subordinated to the commander of the German Armies in the Balkans (German:Befehlshaber Suedost).[15]

    4. KONA 5 was assigned to Army Group B on the Western Front.[16]

References

  1. ↑ "Volume 4 - Signal Intelligence Service of the Army High Command" (PDF). NSA. Retrieved 12 November 2016.
  2. ↑ David Joyner (6 December 2012). Coding Theory and Cryptography: From Enigma and Geheimschreiber to Quantum Theory. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 33. ISBN 978-3-642-59663-6.
  3. ↑ I-96, Page 2
  4. ↑ I-85 page 2
  5. 1 2 Major Jeffrey S. Harley (6 November 2015). Reading The Enemy’s Mail:: Origins And Development Of US Army Tactical Radio Intelligence In World War II, European Theater. Pickle Partners Publishing. p. 23. ISBN 978-1-78625-409-2.
  6. ↑ I-62, Page 6
  7. 1 2 Peter Matthews (2 September 2013). SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence in the World Wars. History Press. p. 142. ISBN 978-0-7524-9301-5.
  8. ↑ I-85, Page 3 - P. O. W. Interrogation Report on Reg. Rat Flicke, Tech, Insp. Pokojewski, Stabsintendant Hatz of OKW/Chi.
  9. ↑ I-78, Page 2
  10. ↑ Bernd Wegner; Germany. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (January 1997). From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939-1941. Berghahn Books. p. 226. ISBN 978-1-57181-882-9.
  11. ↑ IF 181, Page 15
  12. ↑ I-85, Page 2
  13. ↑ I-85, Page 3.
  14. ↑ I-78, Page 4
  15. ↑ IF-171, Page 1
  16. ↑ IF 127
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