Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg
Born	(1957-03-02) March 2, 1957 New York City
Nationality	USA

Institution	MIT
Field	Game theory, General equilibrium Theory
Alma mater	A.B. Harvard College 1978, Ph.D. MIT 1981
Doctoral advisor	Eric Maskin^[1]
Doctoral students	Matthew Rabin Glenn Ellison Sendhil Mullainathan
Contributions	learning in games, Folk theorem
Awards	Guggenheim Fellowship, 1990; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Drew Fudenberg (born March 2, 1957 in New York City) is the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT. His extensive research spans many aspects of game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, evolutionary game theory, and many applications to other fields. Fudenberg was also one of the first to apply game theoretic analysis in industrial organization, bargaining theory, and contract theory. He has also authored papers on repeated games, reputation effects, and behavioral economics.

Biography

Fudenberg obtained his A.B. in Applied Mathematics from Harvard University in 1978, when he went on to obtain his Ph.D. in Economics at MIT. After completing his Ph.D. in just three years, he began his assistant professorship at the University of California, Berkeley in 1981. At Berkeley, Fudenberg was tenured at the age of 28. In 1987, he returned to a faculty position at MIT, where he taught for 6 years. In 1993, Fudenberg accepted a faculty position in the Economics department of his alma mater, Harvard University. He has returned once more to MIT as the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics as of 2016.^[2]

Fudenberg was the associate editor of the Journal of Economic Theory from 1984 to 1996; the Quarterly Journal of Economics from 1984 to 1989; Econometrica from 1985 to 1996; Games and Economic Behavior from 1988 to 1993, and the foreign editor of the Review of Economic Studies from 1993 to 1996. He was also the principal editor of Econometrica from 1996 until 2000.

Fudenberg has authored many books on game theory, including Game Theory with Jean Tirole, a primary reference for graduate students in economics; Dynamic Models of Oligopoly, also with Jean Tirole; and Theory of Learning in Games with David K. Levine.

Fudenberg received the Guggenheim Fellowship in 1990 and became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998.

Publications

Game Theory, coauthor with Jean Tirole
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly coauthor with Jean Tirole
A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games, coauthor with David K. Levine
Theory of Learning in Games, coauthor with David K. Levine

References

↑ Fudenberg, Drew (1981), Strategic behavior in economic rivalry. Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
↑ "MIT Economics : Drew Fudenberg". economics.mit.edu. Retrieved 2016-09-08.

External links

Topics in game theory

Definitions	Normal-form game Extensive-form game Escalation of commitment Graphical game Cooperative game Succinct game Information set Hierarchy of beliefs Preference

Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Gibbs equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium

Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy

Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Simultaneous game Sequential game Repeated game Signaling game Screening game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global games Strictly determined game Potential game

Games	Prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock-paper-scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto games War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Prisoners and hats puzzle Trust game Princess and monster game Monty Hall problem Rendezvous problem

Theorems	Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Folk theorem Revelation principle Arrow's impossibility theorem

Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Ariel Rubinstein Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

See also	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Authority control	WorldCat Identities VIAF: 122100384 LCCN: n97032132 GND: 170071790 MGP: 151145

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